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EXPORT PROMOTION ASSISTANCE IN KOREA:




The Korean Government’s export promotion agencies played only a marginal role in
Korea’s success as a world-class exporter. Between 1961 and 1973, Korea conducted an
aggressive public sector campaign to boost exports with substantial help from the Agency for
International Development (A.I.D.). Evidence suggests that government assistance made only a
marginal contribution to export growth. Korea created a number of government agencies to
bolster its export drive, but their impact on exports was marginal, and they all outlived their
usefulness. These facts should cause A.I.D. to closely examine subsidizing public sector export
institutions in other countries. These findings are reflected in a recent desk study commissioned
by A.I.D.’s Center for Development Information and Evaluation. The study relies on extensive
literature review and numerous interviews with key officials from Korea’s public and private
sectors, as well as a number of U.S. exporters to Korea.
When Korea shifted its focus in the early 1960s away from import-substitution
industrialization, exporters suddenly had to adapt to an environment full of new and unfamiliar
tasks. Had private markets for export services not developed quickly, public export aid might
have been called for to help new exporters with these challenges. However, the private sector
turned out to be a more potent force for providing the services firms needed for export expansion
than either the Korean Government or A.I.D. had anticipated.
BACKGROUND
Korea’s trade policy history can be roughly divided into four phases: (1) an
import-substitution phase prior to 1961; (2) an export-oriented take-off phase that began in 1961
and lasted through 1973; (3) a sectoral development strategy promoting heavy and chemical
industries between 1973 and 1979; and (4) a post-1979 liberalization phase. Macroeconomic
stabilization, devaluation, and a unique administrative system of promoting exports were all
policies fundamental to the take-off during phase 2 (see Figures 1 and 2).
The take-off phase of South Korea’s export-led industrialization program began with
public outrage over illicit accumulation of wealth, which swept the Rhee Government from office
in 1961. The military’s seizure of power was accompanied by a ban on political parties,
restrictions on the press, and a disbanding of unions. The Government also increased taxes on
the private sector, which led to unprecedented control over the allocation of credit. This
consolidation of power gave President Park, who replaced Rhee, a unique opportunity to reform
the bureaucracy and change the relationship between government and business. A firm believer
in rapid economic development, Park instituted reforms that put the reins of economic power
squarely in the hands of the Korean Government, which set the stage for Korea’s
government-directed transition to export-led industrialization.
The Korean Government had experimented with several export promotion approaches
during the late 1950s and early 1960s, and by 1965 key aspects of Korea’s comprehensive export
system were in place. By that point, the Government had begun maintaining macroeconomic
stability and a competitive exchange rate; setting quantitative export targets by firm, industry, and
geographic market; and monitoring performance relative to targets, rewarding firms that met or
exceeded targets with heavily subsidized credit.
At the same time, the Korean Government created a high-level Export Development
Committee (EDC) to provide production and marketing assistance to exporters. It established two
public-sector institutions that set industrial standards, promoted quality control, and provided
inspection and testing of exports. The Korean Trade Promotion Agency (KOTRA), created in
1962 to market Korean exports, carried out market research, engaged in public relations, and
searched for buyers. The Government formed the Korean Institute for Science and Technology
(KIST) in 1966 to overcome its concern about private sector dependence on imported technology.
KIST’s job was to develop an indigenous capacity to generate new industrial technologies. The
Government also created a large number of public-private commodity-specific task forces to
resolve production and marketing problems.
A.I.D.’S APPROACH
A.I.D. played a powerful role in reshaping Korean macroeconomic policy during the
take-off phase. Even though decision-making authority was centralized by the Park Government,
centralization alone did not make for a coherent strategy. U.S. assistance to Korea was so
massive that A.I.D. was able to exert great influence on Korean policymakers. During the early
1960s, A.I.D. financed nearly 50 percent of Korea’s imports. A.I.D.’s primary concerns were
macroeconomic stabilization and stagnating exports. When A.I.D. threatened to suspend aid
disbursements over macroeconomic policy disagreements, the Government negotiated a
stabilization program.
The joint Korean/American Economic Cooperation Council (ECC) created the Export
Promotion Subcommittee (EPSC) to deal with production, administrative, and marketing problems
facing exporters. Both the Government and A.I.D. representatives on EPSC assumed that Korea’s
export potential was severely handicapped in those areas and believed they must prime the pump
if exporters were to succeed. They decided on a commodity-by-commodity assistance strategy.
A.I.D. financed numerous, highly targeted consultants to work with individual firms and
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industries; for example, assistance went to producers of human hair wigs, ceramics, silk cloth,
furniture, canned goods, antiques, men’s garments, footwear, paper, cement, shrimp, and
embroidered handkerchiefs.
A.I.D.’s strategy was also to assist Korea’s newly created public sector institutions, such
as KIST, the National Industrial Research Institute (NIRI), and KOTRA.
KIST’s mission, to develop an indigenous capacity to generate new industrial technologies
to meet the needs of private industry, was a massive task, well beyond the capacity of the Korean
scientific community. The Korean Government and A.I.D. turned to the Battelle Memorial
Institute for help. Battelle helped KIST develop links to the international science community,
recruit trained senior staff, and identify research projects.
KOTRA’s job was to provide information for Korea’s new export manufacturers and to
conduct market research. It identified Korea’s competitors and the price and quality of their
goods, explored foreign demand for Korean goods, promoted exports through public relations,
and found buyers. A.I.D. provided a range of assistance to KOTRA, including a survey and
assessment of the organization. It also arranged for the president of KOTRA to visit the heads
of large U.S. buying chains in the United States.
The Korean Government created NIRI to carry out export inspections and testing. A.I.D.
supported NIRI by providing two full-time specialists and numerous short-term experts. It also
financed a review of Korea’s quality inspection system for exports and brought in a full-time
quality control adviser to assist in establishing a quality control association. A.I.D. organized
several trips abroad for Korean technicians to study quality control methods used in Hong Kong,
Japan, and Taiwan. A.I.D. support also helped to establish private sector inspection laboratories
in Taegu and Pusan. At A.I.D.’s urging, NIRI built, equipped, and trained individuals for six
nongovernmental inspection and testing institutes.
Government-directed export promotion combined with distrust of the private sector and
misunderstanding of its capabilities led to an assistance strategy heavily reliant on public sector
service providers. Although A.I.D.’s technical assistance advisers occasionally nudged services
provision in a private sector direction, neither A.I.D. nor the Government gave much thought to
the role Korean entrepreneurs or the international private sector might play in expanding exports.
This tendency limited the effectiveness of the Government’s export promotion drive.
FINDINGS
Some private sector industries already had significant indigenous marketing and
production capabilities, even though the governmental export drive was meant to compensate for
shortcomings in the private sector. Some Korean entrepreneurs had strong ties with private sector
firms in several developed countries, most notably Japan.
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For centuries Korea lived in extreme international isolation, which ended abruptly when
Korea opened its ports in 1876. By 1910, Korea had been exposed to substantial modern industry.
During the Japanese occupation from 1910 to 1945, Korea industrialized further. During this
period, factory output grew at a compound annual rate of 10 percent and total production tripled.
Exports reached 30 percent of national income. Much of this growth was in textiles, a leading
export industry during the first decade of the post-1960 expansion (see Table 1).
Significantly, the period of 1910 to 1945 spawned an indigenous financial, commercial,
and industrial elite. Though small, this elite evolved into the leaders of Korea’s industrial
conglomerates, or post-1960 chaebol, which came to dominate the Korean economy. The period
from 1910 to 1945 also saw the emergence of smaller independent entrepreneurs who became
active exporters in the 1960s. In sum, the Korean entrepreneurial class possessed considerable
skill and experience. Japanese language skills, education in Japanese universities and factories,
and technical assistance from many European and Asian machinery suppliers combined to form
a private export sector with the means to "fill the gap" in export services.
Most of Korea’s post-1961 industrial expansion resulted from an increase in firm size
rather than a rise in the number of firms. Korean entrepreneurs clearly knew how to export
manufactures and were in touch with customer preference in developed-country markets. Once
the post-1961 incentive system removed the bias against exports, they were well-positioned to
exploit new opportunities. This readiness probably explains why the supply response of Korea’s
entrepreneurs was so quick and substantial, suggesting that countries without such an
entrepreneurial class might experience a lower supply response.
Studies conducted in the mid-1970s, as well as interviews by the Center for Development
Information and Evaluation (CDIE) with key public and private sector actors involved in early
export expansion, provide insight into the role of government in assisting exporters. Korean
entrepreneurs reported that they went overwhelmingly to the firm’s chief executive and/or other
employees for assistance in conceiving new projects or markets, acquiring new technology, and
finding relevant training. They sometimes turned to the Korean Government for financing (22.5
percent of the time), for conceptualization (6.5 percent of the time), but almost never for
technology acquisition or technical training.
Korean firms ranked importers as their most important marketing source (see Table 2).
When asked about their first contact with buyers in new export markets, exporters ranked
KOTRA near the bottom in importance. Some Korean industries relied on KOTRA’s activities
and overseas offices to find buyers, but most found that the complexity of styling and design
issues for ready-made garments was beyond KOTRA’s capabilities. Also, KOTRA had a limited
understanding of the complexity of marketing channels. Japanese trading companies could bring
enormous marketing experience to bear, although they may have charged high margins. These
companies tended to know buyers’ reputations, could easily get letters of credit, and helped settle
quality complaints. KOTRA’s role of finding buyers was also limited by the fact that plenty of
buyers, especially big buyers, came to Korea on their own.
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This does not mean that KOTRA did not play a role in early export expansion. Virtually
everyone interviewed stated that KOTRA’s overseas offices were havens for Korean
manufacturing visitors in the early days. They provided a "home abroad," arranging contacts and
providing access to cheaper international telephones and telexes.
Korea relied heavily on foreign loans to finance the import of foreign capital goods
containing new technology. Multinational corporations did not fill the technology gap because
direct foreign investment in Korea was relatively small, as was their contribution of technical
assistance and licensing. In a survey of 112 exporting firms, foreign sources provided 68 percent
of basic process and product innovation technology. The Japanese had given production
assistance to virtually every firm interviewed, demonstrating once again the crucial role of the
Japanese private sector in Korea’s export drive. Even now, Korea relies heavily on imported
technology, as evidenced by the continued dependence on exports that use foreign-buyer
specifications.
Firms turned to KIST for new technology less than 10 percent of the time. KIST’s role
in technology transfer and development was limited, especially in the early years of export
expansion. The Government only established KIST after export expansion was well underway,
and its research effort focused mainly on import substitution. Few of KIST’s technology
development projects were successfully commercialized.
Korea also invested heavily in education and training, and encouraged labor mobility
among firms, contributing to extensive local know-how in basic production technology. The
Government complemented this investment in human capital with the 1961 Foreign Capital
Inducement Act (FCIA). The FCIA controlled and monitored foreign investment in Korean
industry; for instance, all foreign investors had to, or were encouraged to, enter into a joint
venture with a Korean firm. Under the joint-venture agreement, the foreign partner was required
to train the Korean partner’s personnel. After they learned the basic technology, the Government
closed the sector to additional foreign investment.
Overall, these findings suggest that public sector aid to exporters had a minimal impact
on export expansion in Korea. It is possible that some successful exporters interviewed were
biased about their own role in export expansion, but the preponderance of evidence suggests
otherwise.
IMPLICATIONS
The CDIE evaluation of Korea’s export services assistance program in the early 1960s
has several important implications for A.I.D.
• Be careful in identifying the rationale for intervention in export markets. Test that
rationale against reality before intervening. The Korean Government and A.I.D.
seriously underestimated the capacity of Korean entrepreneurs and their foreign
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associates to meet the needs of exporters of manufactures. Distrust of the private
sector led the Government to assume market failure in the export services markets.
This assumption proved wrong. Both the Government and A.I.D. underestimated the
industrial and export experience of the Koreans during the period of Japanese
colonialism. In addition, substantial technical assistance in production, especially in
textiles prior to 1961, was all but ignored. The Government and A.I.D. should have
undertaken a serious assessment of the private sector’s capacity, including the foreign
private sector, to meet the production and marketing needs of new exporters before
providing public sector support.
• Focus on helping nascent exporters develop long-term collaborative relationships with
developed-country buyers, manufacturers and foreign machinery suppliers. Remember
that the international private sector can provide highly valuable services to exporters.
Korean exporters relied heavily on marketing assistance from Japanese trading
companies and importers/buyers; many continue to do so. They turned to foreign
machinery suppliers for production innovation assistance. International sources also
provided help with quality control. All these services had a significant impact on
export expansion.
• Avoid creating public sector export institutions, or subject them to sunset provisions.
None of the institutions created by the Government have found a raison d’être or a
productive role to play. KOTRA has continually been forced to create new roles for
itself—with only limited success—as the Korean private sector’s overseas marketing
experience increased. Sustainability problems have also confronted KIST, which has
had difficulty funding itself through private sector contract research. The six private
sector export inspection and testing institutes established by the Government have met
similar fates. It is difficult to reform or close an institution after it has been created,
so the decision to adopt a strategy of public provision of export services should not
be taken lightly.
This Evaluation Highlights summarizes the findings of the report entitled Can Export
Services Assistance Make a Difference: The Korean Experience, by Michael T. Rock, Technical
Report No. 7, April 1993 (PN-AAX-264). The report can be ordered from the DISC,
1611 North Kent Street, Suite 200, Arlington, VA 22209-2111, telephone (703) 351-4006, fax
(703) 351-4039.
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